What's happening in Syria? A simple explanation by Igar Tyshkevich.

The Syrian opposition has launched an offensive and has almost effortlessly captured the city of Aleppo — the largest city in the country and the administrative center of the Aleppo province. Following this, Assad's opponents advanced rapidly towards the city of Hama and nearly seized it. This summarizes the current wave of information regarding events in Syria. A second key point being promoted in the Ukrainian information space is the defeat of the Russian Federation through the downfall of its proxy, which is perceived to be Bashar Assad. Lastly, there is the potential overthrow of the country's president. Against this backdrop, various names of armed groups emerge, which an inquisitive reader attempts to categorize as either supporting or opposing Assad.

In reality, the situation is somewhat more complex. To understand it better, one should look back at the period of the civil war in Syria.

Understanding the Syrian entanglement in simple terms.

To avoid overwhelming details, here are a few extremely important points:

1. The Civil War involved not just two sides (as is commonly believed), but around a dozen political groups and formations. In simple terms, "everyone fought against everyone." At a certain stage, all were united against the "Islamic State." The latter was the only force capable of aligning irreconcilable opponents of the Syrian conflict "on one front."

2. At least 15 foreign countries were involved in the civil war (formally in the fight against ISIS) within Syrian territory. Among them, 6 — Russia, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, the USA, Lebanon, and the UK — participated in ground battles. An additional 12+ launched airstrikes against ISIS positions with their air forces.

3. The civil war in Syria for a significant portion of the provinces ended not with "a fight to the last soldier," but rather through political agreements with local groups. Some leaders and fighters of the "irreconcilable" opposition fled north to Idlib or south within the country.

4. Such "consolidation" led to greater tolerance within the so-called "Syrian opposition," where ideologically diverse forces — ranging from nominal "secular democrats" to Islamists from "Al-Qaeda" — are compelled to coexist in the same territory. Meanwhile, the southern opposition "enclave" (part of Homs province) is economically reintegrating with the rest of the country.

However, the most intriguing aspect concerns the balance of power in northern Syria. Early in the conflict, Turkey actively supported the political and military formations of the Syrian Turkmen, or as they are also referred to, "Syrian Turkomans." Consequently, a "protosstate" was established in their settlement area, complete with its own governing bodies and an economy tied to Turkey rather than Syria. For the understanding of the Ukrainian reader — this is somewhat analogous to the "DPR" within Syrian territory.

The second major enclave is Syrian Kurdistan. This territory is populated and controlled by Kurds, existing in the format of an unrecognized state. This is a crucial detail, as Turkey's intervention in the Syrian civil war was driven not only by the activity of ISIS and obligations to NATO allies, but also (or primarily) by the expansion of Kurdish forces' control. If Syrian Kurdistan were to gain access to the sea, one could discuss the emergence of a new state and the prospects for its recognition, at least by some Western countries. This was something Turkey could not allow. Therefore, the most extensive Turkish military operations in northern Syria were directed not against the Islamic State, but against Kurdish forces.

The crisis is not over or the expectation of a political process

As mentioned above, the civil war in Syria is not over. More precisely, by 2023, its active phase has concluded. The next stage involves political settlement, which was supposed to entail a reform of the governance system and the cooptation of some opposition forces into power. Assad was not in a hurry regarding this. On the contrary, he strengthened his power, postponing the consultation process on transition to a later date. Furthermore, there was no unity among the "opposition forces." There is a "unified opposition" with its own demands (which, by the way, is far from being united internally), pro-Turkish formations in the North, and the Kurds. The Assad government tried to reach out to each of these groups to discuss the future. However, bringing everyone together "at one table" seriously (with real results) proved impossible for anyone. Finally, there are external forces: Russia, Iran (and its dependent Hezbollah), which play a significant role in stabilizing the situation, the USA, which has maintained its contingent in Syrian Kurdistan, and, of course, Turkey. Each of these sides has its own vision for Syria's future structure and its interests in the country.

Moreover, in the event of the opposition forces' intransigence, Bashar Assad could play into a political reform internally and negotiate with one of the groups. Either with the Kurds, or with the opposition in Homs, or with the Turkomans. But

• an agreement with the Kurds is not in Turkey's interest

• an agreement with the Turkomans (read: Turkey) is not in the interest of the Kurds, as well as Iran (which competes with Turkey for influence) and, under certain circumstances, Russia

• restructuring power "internally," at most taking into account a compromise with the South, is beneficial to Iran and Russia, but unacceptable for Turkey, the Turkomans, the Kurds, and the USA.

Against this backdrop, Ankara begins to contemplate its own operation. Its goal would be to sharply enhance its positions at the expense of, primarily, Iran. This is a critically important aspect, as limiting Iran's influence in the region benefits the USA, meaning the United States could "agree" to the implementation of a second goal — weakening Kurdish positions. Especially since a Kurdish enclave remains north of Aleppo, which the Turks were unable to eliminate during the "Olive Branch" operation.

If successful, Turkey would gain control over a territory equivalent to one and a half provinces, which includes the largest city in the country (at least as of the beginning of the civil war). If there is an existing local administration there, it would be the first and primary potential participant in negotiations with Damascus regarding the future structure of the country. Thus, Ankara significantly strengthens its own positions in the Syrian crisis. At the same time, the overthrow of Bashar Assad is of no interest to Turkey. Weakening, some transition of power, and formalizing Turkish influence — yes. However, seizing power and taking responsibility for a fairly large state is not something they desire at all.

Implementation of the plan and a brief forecast.

Combat actions commenced and unfolded entirely within the framework of the described logic. The attack began at a time of significant weakening of Iranian and Hezbollah presence. The former were occupied with their internal problems and supporting proxies in their confrontation with Israel, while the latter were directly involved in combat actions against Israeli forces.

The first to launch the attack were the HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) — an Islamist organization that emerged from the merger of the local branch of "Al-Qaeda" and three Syrian Salafist groups. The geography of their advance coincided with the locations of Hezbollah and IRGC checkpoints. Meanwhile, local army officers were either demoralized or bribed. The validity of this assumption is supported by the fact that the primary casualties "on the Assad side" were Iranians or Lebanese. The Syrian motorized brigade simply withdrew from Aleppo, including from the fortress in the city center, which government forces had held for all four years of fighting for the city (and this is significant from the perspective of informational influence in the region).

The further advance of HTS units was accompanied by Turkey's calls for a "peaceful resolution of the crisis," but simultaneously, the "Syrian National Army" (a military structure serving as the army of the Syrian Turkomans) was engaged in battles north of Aleppo.

Concurrently, anticipating future problems, the "Syrian Democratic Forces" — one of the "Kurdish armies" — began their actions. SDF entered the Kurdish-populated northeastern suburbs of Aleppo and attempted to march eastward to create a land corridor connecting the Syrian enclave in Aleppo province with Syrian Kurdistan.

Such a turn of events could not be permitted by pro-Turkish forces. Last night and this morning, the SNA fought against the SDF and managed to push the Kurds out of villages along Route №4 in the Aleppo — Deir Hafer area. Fighting began between the Kurds and Turkomans over Deir Hafer itself. Simultaneously, HTS issued an ultimatum for the Kurdish SDF to leave Aleppo "in the interest of ensuring security."

This means that in the coming days, the area northeast of Aleppo may become a zone of fierce battles between pro-Turkish formations and Kurdish units. Especially since mobilization has already been declared in the territory of Syrian Kurdistan.

The second front (not the main one) — movement towards Hama and further south. Active battles are starting there between the Syrian government forces and HTS units. I emphasize — precisely between the units of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, not the SNA. These battles are unlikely to end with a swift defeat of one side but will merely establish a