The end of the era of Russian gas exports to Europe via Ukraine: lesser-known facts - Mikhail Gonchar.

So, it has happened! Kyiv stood firm against the onslaught of Kremlin's Trojan horses in the EU, resisting the corruption-laden temptations of "Azerbaijani" or other gas, and ultimately forced Moscow to stop gas exports to Europe through transit via Ukraine. As a result, the aggressor will lose about $6-6.5 billion in annual revenue from gas exports, which is one of the channels for financing the war.

Given the historical significance of this event – the end of a more than half-century era of Russian gas exports to Europe via Ukraine – it’s worth mentioning some lesser-known facts.

Before the Soviet Union became a gas exporter along the East-West route, gas within the USSR moved from west to east during the 1950s to 1970s. This gas was Ukrainian, extracted from both the western part of the country – the Dashava field and the east – Shebelinka. Through the pipelines Dashava – Kyiv – Bryansk – Moscow and Dashava – Minsk – Vilnius – Riga, natural gas from western Ukrainian fields was supplied to Russia and other Soviet republics (see the map-scheme of the Dashava – Kyiv – Moscow pipeline marked "Secret" and "Declassified").

The modern route for natural gas flows from East to West, originating from the giant fields of Central Asia, the Urals, and Western Siberia to Europe, was formed during the 1960s to 1980s amid the Cold War. Initially, export gas supplies were directed only to specific satellite countries of the USSR in Eastern Europe – members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) – Poland and Czechoslovakia, and later to neutral Austria and Finland.

The escalation of Soviet-Chinese relations, culminating in an armed conflict in March 1969 over Damansky Island on the Amur River, posed a threat of a two-front war for the USSR, according to the Kremlin's perspective at the time – with the USA and NATO in the west and China in the east. This prompted Soviet leadership to shift towards a policy of détente with the West, especially since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 ended unfavorably for the USSR. The start of negotiations in November 1969 in Helsinki between the USSR and the USA to limit strategic offensive arms accelerated the signing of the well-known 20-year "gas-pipes" contract between the Soviet Union and West Germany. With its signing, large-scale projects for the construction of transcontinental gas transportation systems began, through which natural gas was to reach Western Europe – to Germany, Italy, and France.

It remains a lesser-known fact that the first export supplies of natural gas from the USSR were actually sourced from fields located in the western part of Ukraine. Gas exports to the west, which began from Poland in 1956, were expanded through a new pipeline with the symbolic name "Brotherhood" (Dolina – Uzhhorod – State Border). This pipeline started supplying blue fuel to Czechoslovakia. The launch of "Brotherhood" took place in 1967, and within the next year, the pipeline from Slovakia was extended beyond the Eastern Bloc, allowing gas to flow into neutral Austria.

Another lesser-known fact is that the design work for the major Soviet gas transportation systems was carried out in Ukraine, in Kyiv. After Ukraine was liberated from Nazi occupation on September 29, 1944, "UkrDIPROGAZPALPROM" was established in Kyiv – the Ukrainian branch of the Moscow State Institute for the Design of Industrial Liquid Fuels and Gas Enterprises "DIPROGAZPALPROM". After several transformations, this Ukrainian design organization became the All-Union Research and Design Institute for Natural Gas Transportation "VNIPITRANSGAZ" of the USSR Ministry of Gas Industry. This institute developed the design documentation for the first main gas pipelines, both within the USSR and for export, including Dashava – Kyiv – Bryansk – Moscow, "Soyuz" (Orenburg – Western Border of the USSR); "Progress" (Yamburg – Western Border of the USSR); Central Asia – Center; USSR – People's Republic of Bulgaria; Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod; Torzhok – Dolina, as well as many others in Russia.

It is worth recalling that these large-scale infrastructure projects were implemented to increase foreign currency inflows to the USSR, which needed them to achieve military parity with the USA and NATO. This could be achieved by exporting energy resources to NATO member countries and the European Economic Community (EEC). However, the Soviet leadership was driven not only by currency needs. The goal of significantly ramping up oil and gas exports was to create dependency in Western Europe on the USSR, to pull it away from the USA, with neutral Austria and Finland expected to become more favorable to Moscow.

Ivan Diak, a corresponding member of the Academy of Mining Sciences of Ukraine, who held leadership positions in the Ukrainian state company "Ukrgazprom" from 1972 to 1998 and was directly involved in the construction projects of Soviet gas pipelines, particularly emphasizes the early 1980s. According to his recollections, it was during this time that the Soviet leadership finally articulated the strategic goal of creating transcontinental gas transportation systems. East – West: "The CPSU Central Committee sets tasks for the construction of pipelines that would allow the supply of up to 70% of the necessary gas to Western Europe – this would ensure that European countries become completely dependent on Soviet energy resources... the USSR would be able to exert economic and political influence on Western Europe. Additionally, this would minimize US influence on European countries, contributing to the transformation of the USSR into a global superpower."

The Soviet intentions regarding the dependency of Europe's leading economy on gas supplies from the East are highlighted by Russian experts, who draw attention to a fragment of a memo from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs "On the Political Line and Some Practical Steps of the USSR in Connection with the Formation of the Willy Brandt Government in West Germany," presented to the CPSU Central Committee on December 1, 1969: "Achieving an agreement on the supply of Soviet natural gas to West Germany could be of significant importance. This concerns the conclusion of a contract that would operate for two decades and would to a considerable extent place such a vital sector of the West German economy as energy into dependence on the Soviet Union."

By the way, today is not only New Year's Day but also St. Basil's Day! Therefore, there's an opportunity to congratulate those veterans of the industry who created Ukraine's gas transportation system – including the aforementioned Ivan VASILIEVICH Diak and VASILY VASILIEVICH Rozgonuk, who previously held leadership positions in "Ukrgazprom" and "Naftogaz". Incidentally, today is both an Angel's Day and a birthday for Vasily Vasilievich! So if you see him, make sure to congratulate!

And considering that exactly 16 years ago, Gazprom, under the Kremlin's directive, resorted to gas aggression against Ukraine and the EU, it's important to mention those who not only stood firm but also skillfully showed Moscow "the Kuzka's mother," turning the gas transportation system to reverse mode within 36 hours to supply gas from western underground gas storage facilities to the center, south, and east, leaving Moscow with no chance to orchestrate a Holodomor in the cold of January 2009. Under the leadership of then-head of "Naftogaz" Oleg Dubina and his deputy and engineering genius of the gas transportation system, Yaroslav Marchuk, the impossible was accomplished, after which both Russia and Europe concluded – "it turns out that it could be done" and the possibility of reverse use of pipelines became a norm in the EU. They, and all of us, were unaware at the time how the Kremlin's scenario was thwarted.

The gas crisis of 2009 had far-reaching goals. It was intended to act as a detonator for provoking a political conflict in Ukraine along the East-West line. The plan was that in the event of a complete cessation of gas supplies (for internal consumption + transit to the EU), the authorities in Ukraine would be unable to ensure its supply from the main underground gas storage facilities located in the west of the country to the east, to the main industrial centers, which would be left without gas and heat. Thus, this was supposed to provoke, according to Russian strategists' plans, "a social explosion in the east and south of Ukraine." It’s no coincidence that on January 12, 2009, Russian media published articles on "border revision" in the CIS and statements from Russian politicians: "State Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin does not rule out that Russia 'will send a signal' to the southeastern regions of Ukraine at the right moment for their incorporation into Russia." This signal could have been sent just a few days later if the Ukrainian side had agreed to Gazprom's proposal of January 13 to resume gas transit to the Balkans and Turkey along their scheme. The Chairman of the Board of Naftogaz of Ukraine, Oleg Dubina, rejected this proposal: "The proposal that came from Russia to pump gas through the pipeline in Ukraine with entry into the GTS 'Sudja 1200' to Moldova, Bulgaria, and Romania could threaten that we would have to cut off gas to Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk. If Kyiv had succumbed to Gazprom's offer, the residents of major cities, as well as several smaller industrial cities in the east and south of Ukraine, would