Munich 1938 and 2025: eerily similar scenarios, yet fundamentally different wars - Timothy Snyder.

The symmetry between Germany-Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Russia-Ukraine in 2022 is striking, and if we pause for a moment to consider these similarities, it can help us gain a broader perspective on the present day. Now, more than ever, we are prisoners of rumors, disinformation, and the emotions of the moment. History can at least provide us with a calmer perspective. So, consider this:

Hitler denied the legitimacy of the Czechoslovak state. As Chancellor of Germany, he systematically denied that it had the right to exist. Although its leaders were democratically elected, he claimed they had no right to govern. Since the population spoke different languages, he argued that there was no such thing as Czechoslovak citizens. Hitler contended that Czechoslovakia itself was artificial, a result of a historical turn that should never have occurred – the settlement after World War I. He asserted that the existence of a national minority gave him the right to intervene in Czechoslovak politics. In May 1938, he ordered his army to prepare for a swift attack on Czechoslovakia. He also activated his agents within the country. On September 12, Hitler delivered a fiery speech to Germans about the entirely fabricated extermination of the German minority in Czechoslovakia.

We know what happened next: Britain and France, along with Germany and Italy, decided in Munich on September 30 that Czechoslovakia must cede critically important border territories to Germany. These were the most defensible parts of the country. Czechoslovak leaders, despite not being consulted, decided to accept the head of their country.

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Of course, we cannot detail what could have happened. However, if Czechoslovakia had resisted, we can be quite certain that there would not have been a World War II, at least not one like the one Europe experienced starting in September 1939.

The war against Czechoslovakia in 1938 would indeed have been difficult for the Germans. Hitler was not bluffing, but his army was not prepared. The division of Czechoslovakia without a fight significantly eased his task. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, it utilized intact Czechoslovak tanks and other Czechoslovak weaponry. He also controlled Czechoslovak economic and human resources. If Czechoslovakia had resisted, this would not have happened. Even if we assume that Czechoslovakia would eventually have been defeated by Germany, Germany would not have been able to attack Poland so quickly. Furthermore, when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, it relied on its alliance with the USSR, cemented in August by agreements known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. If Czechoslovakia had resisted, it would have been much more challenging for the Soviet Union to adopt this active form of appeasement towards the Nazis. It is unclear whether Germany would have decided to invade Poland at all without Soviet support.

Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that Germany would have been at least slowed down and deprived of the prestige and confidence that emerged after its lightning victories over Poland in 1939 and then over France in 1940. Czechoslovak resistance would have made appeasing Hitler, which by then was the main direction of European policy, nearly impossible.

Now let’s consider some deeper similarities between 1938 and 2022. The coincidence of two meetings in Munich is part of two longer histories that are eerily similar.

Putin denied the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. Although its leaders were democratically elected, he claimed they had no right to govern. Since its people speak different languages, he argued that there is no such concept as a community of Ukrainian citizens. Hitler [as it appears in the original, it should be Putin — S.G.] claimed that Ukraine itself is artificial, a result of a historical turn that should never have happened – the collapse of the Soviet Union. He asserted that the existence of a national minority gave him the right to intervene in Ukrainian politics. At some point in 2021, he ordered his army to prepare for a swift strike against Ukraine. He also activated his agents within the country. In a series of speeches in December of that year, Putin provided justifications for the upcoming invasion of Ukraine.

Here the timeline takes a different turn. At the beginning of 2022, something occurred that few expected beyond Ukraine.

Ukrainian leaders decided to resist. Although it was generally expected that President Zelensky would flee to a foreign capital and form a government in exile, he remained in Kyiv. His position was stronger than it might have seemed. While Ukraine was new and relatively unknown to European states, it was a democracy and an industrialized nation. It had one of the best arms industries in Europe, and its command had a plan to allow Russian forces to penetrate in, and then encircle and destroy them. While wise heads in Moscow and Washington expected the Russians to reach Kyiv within three days, in reality, the Russians were defeated near Kharkiv and Kyiv, although they succeeded in the southeast. By the end of 2022, Ukraine had regained about half of the territory seized by Russia in the first weeks of the war. European public opinion turned against the aggressors. Appeasing Russia became complicated. Russia was forced to redeploy troops from other regions and then seek help from China, Iran, and North Korea.

This time, without italics: this is exactly how it happened. And these events give us a sense of what we could lose.

Three years into the war, the outcome remains uncertain. What is undeniable is that a larger war has not begun. Ukraine has destroyed a significant portion of Russian armed forces and pushed Russian troops away from NATO borders. With certain help from allies, it essentially fulfills NATO's entire mission with its own armed forces and without NATO membership. Indirectly, but significantly, Ukraine contributed to the fall of Assad in Syria, distracting Russian air forces and other troops.

By resisting, Ukraine has also made other aggressive wars less likely. Although it has gone largely unnoticed, Russia has utilized nuclear bluff throughout the war. By ignoring this and resisting a conventional invasion with conventional means, Ukraine has demonstrated to the world that nuclear weapons are not necessary to confront a nuclear state. This, like much else, depended on Ukraine's ongoing ability to fight.

While one can never be certain where a counterfactual example leads, the events in Czechoslovakia in 1938 help clarify the stakes of the war in Ukraine. In the former case, the timeline led to a world war as unnecessary concessions to Hitler created opportunities he would not have otherwise had. The Czechoslovaks were certainly not the main culprits. If Britain and France had not joined Italy and Germany in the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia would have found it much easier to resist. In my opinion, Czechoslovakia could have done so anyway, thus preventing a world war. But it is important to understand that great powers also bear responsibility.

If Czechoslovakia had acted to prevent a world war, it is very unlikely that anyone's imagination would have gone that far. Hardly anyone thanks the Czechoslovaks for preventing what did not happen. Instead, history knew the Sudeten War, or the Central European War, or something like that. This is worth remembering. We do not appreciate what Ukrainians have prevented. We lack the imagination or perhaps the generosity necessary to see our own interests.

None of the upper echelons of Mask-Trump, I assume, are pondering what would have happened if Ukraine had not resisted, or what will happen if American policy makes this resistance impossible. For some reason, most high-ranking officials in the Trump administration have taken a stance reminiscent of the Russian view of the war. But Russia can only win if it is appeased, that is, helped. Three years later, Americans seem to be rushing to Munich to placate the aggressor. (Except for Secretary of State Marco Rubio, whose plane reportedly had a mechanical failure).

One way to view the current state of events is that Ukrainians are keeping us in a sort of suspended 1938, a 1938 that has lasted for three years. 1938 was far from ideal, but it was much better than 1939 and a world war. Through their resistance, Ukrainians have created a timeline that would not otherwise exist. The rest of us, while living in this time, have done little to earn it.

Whatever other motives the Trump administration may have in appeasing Russia, this lack of appreciation is one of them. Trump himself, his Vice President, a person of power (Musk), and their surroundings generally tend to view Ukraine as a certain irritant, as a problem rather than a solution. They are far from understanding that Ukraine is holding back chaos and war far beyond its borders. Or perhaps, in some cases, they blame Ukraine for that very achievement because they want war and chaos.

Be that as it may, Trump’s policy, at least in recent days, has been a race toward appeasement. He has tried to conduct normal conversations with Putin. His administration