Tuesday21 January 2025
obkom.org.ua

Ukraine shouldn't force Russians out of the Kharkiv region, and here's why - Alexander Kovalenko.

Military analyst Alexander Kovalenko from the Information Resistance group discussed the specific circumstances in the Kharkiv region.
Александр Коваленко объясняет, почему Украине не следует выгонять россиян из Харьковской области.

Against the backdrop of certain intensification in the Kursk region, ardent enthusiasts of "betrayal" have once again lamented, ranging from "instead of the Kursk region, they should have sent these troops to Kurakhovo" to "instead of the Kursk region, they should have liberated northern Kharkiv region." While the first argument regarding Pokrovsk and Kurakhovo has been explained a hundred times, and those who understood have done so long ago, the situation with the Kharkiv region remains less clear… or has it been clarified?

In essence, everything new is just well-forgotten old: "When will the occupiers be pushed out of northern Kharkiv region?"

To this question, I will respond in a way that may shock many: "Why?"

But before triggering anyone, it’s worth noting the following…

Before the formation of the "North" group, there were troop formations near the Ukrainian border totaling slightly more than 35,000. The "Belgorod" group had just over 15,000 personnel, while the "Bryansk" and "Kursk" groups each had around 10,000. After the unification into the "North" group, this number increased to 50,000, and just before the offensive on Kharkiv region on May 10, their total number reached 53,000. The former "Belgorod" group remained the largest, with around 40,000 personnel, now approximately 55,000.

This resource is still insufficient to improve the situation of the ROV on the Volchansk direction and in the Liptsy area. Moreover, the Kursk region fired up in August 2024, and over the past few months, the ROV command was forced to increase the "Kursk" group to 55,000, again without significant success on the battlefield.

Kharkiv region is draining resources from ROV and restraining them in this location. By opening two new front sections, Russia cannot abandon them due to the stubbornness of the top brass, yet they also cannot achieve success there. In effect, Kharkiv region is extracting excess resources from ROV that need to be regularly replenished and supplied.

If the Russians are completely driven out of the Kharkiv region now, they will have the opportunity to concentrate the freed-up resources on one or several directions.

The Russian command, through its performance in the Kharkiv region, not only failed to achieve tactical and especially operational-tactical successes, wasting thousands of human resources and continuing to do so, but also trapped itself in a situation that is nearly impossible to escape. For if they simply pull their troops out of these two operational areas, the question will arise: "What was all this for, and at such a cost?"

Moreover, on the eve of Donald Trump's inauguration, the withdrawal of ROV troops from northern Kharkiv region would appear as yet another demonstrative reputational slap in the face to Putin. Therefore, Moscow will cling to northern Kharkiv region until the last moment, pouring resources into it despite problems in other areas.

Northern Kharkiv region serves as a restraining zone, where the monotonous grinding of the enemy continues, preventing them from moving troops to assist in other areas, such as reinforcing the Kursk group, since there are no resources for that. Pat.