"Hands off Budanov": The former head of intelligence reveals how Kremlin agents are undermining the GUR. An interview with General Skipalsky.

Another issue hindering the transformation of such crucial structures for Ukraine's security is purely internal. It is the case that, at times, certain agencies, much like during the Soviet era, prefer loyal and devoted individuals over professionals when it comes to personnel selection. This is a very alarming trend. Specifically, for this reason, no military structure can today be guaranteed against the leakage of secret data.

This opinion was expressed in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA by the first head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine from 1992 to 1997, former deputy head of the SBU, honorary chairman of the Union of Officers of Ukraine, Lieutenant General Aleksandr Skipalsky.

– The offensive of the Russian occupation army has been ongoing since October of last year. We are all expecting at least a halt to the occupier's advance, or better yet, a turning point in the war in our favor. What does Ukraine lack the most today to make this happen? What is the enemy's main advantage – manpower or something else?

– First and foremost, it is essential to understand that Ukraine is fighting against a very powerful enemy and doing so courageously. I would like to pay my respects to those who have given their lives for Ukraine, and to those who are defending the Motherland under very difficult circumstances today. I do not know of any other country that could withstand and successfully defend itself in such conditions against such a bloodthirsty and numerous enemy.

However, there are undoubtedly problematic issues. Many criticize our Western partners for not providing enough assistance, etc. But I would take a broader view of this problem. Delays in aid and certain restrictions do not happen by chance. They arise from a misjudgment of the strategic threats posed to democratic countries in the West, primarily the United States, by countries with totalitarian systems of governance. The threat primarily exists for them, as Ukraine has once again found itself at the crossroads of these events. Today, Ukraine is effectively defending the territorial integrity of Europe, protecting Europeans from the aggression of totalitarian states.

Regarding attempts to appease the aggressor... Neither a lion nor a tiger will ever eat cabbage. They will seek meat. However, the leadership of Western countries, particularly the United States, hoped that Russia could be placated and satisfied with something. This is why delays in providing assistance to Ukraine arose, which had a significant impact.

It is worth noting that more and more intelligent individuals and politicians in the West are realizing this. We must thank our allies, as their assistance is the foundation for new capabilities of the Armed Forces to deter the enemy and achieve possible victory. This is the first point.

The second point is Ukraine's internal politics. The formation of power structures through manual, voluntaristic management has led to a decline in professionalism and certain moral aspects within these structures. Personally, I often have to respond to questions from servicemen, especially those returning from the front line injured: "Mr. General, what kind of Ukraine are we fighting for? Are we fighting for Ukraine for Arahamiya? We need to fight for Ukraine for Ukrainians."

Corruption and irresponsibility also affect the development of the defense industry and the provision of the Armed Forces. The lack of real struggle and accountability for corrupt individuals has diminished public trust in the authorities. We have witnessed total collusion, particularly among those dealing with mobilization issues, etc. Such a course leads to degradation.

When the Ministry of Defense is accused of transferring billions abroad, yet a warehouse manager is held accountable while ministers and deputy ministers continue their activities unscathed, this is not fighting corruption; it is not restoring order.

Another problem is the involvement of non-professionals in power structures or individuals performing unclear and unsuitable functions. One person cannot simultaneously lead both the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is a management system, and it must be adhered to. Attempting to manage it manually leads to complications.

Therefore, we must work on two fronts: educating and training our mobilization resources, explaining to society, but the authorities must also set an example of integrity, orderliness, and high morality. If this does not happen, it poses a threat to Ukraine.

– You mentioned the involvement of non-professionals in power structures and the formation of authority through manual management. Do you believe there is an urgent need today to reconsider such approaches? In particular, regarding the formation of personnel in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense?

– Absolutely, this is evident not only in the Main Intelligence Directorate. This problem exists in the Security Service and other agencies and ministries, where personnel are selected not always for their professionalism, but always for their loyalty. Professionals have their viewpoints. By listening to them, a leader can make the most rational decision rather than a subjective one influenced by mood, whispers, suggestions, etc.

As for the Main Intelligence Directorate, it is my reason for existence. For five years, from 1992 to 1997, I, together with like-minded colleagues, created and led this structure. We built military intelligence on entirely new principles. Even then, we understood the need for a national military intelligence service that would not be based on Soviet or even imperial principles, but on new foundations. We managed to lay the groundwork for statehood in intelligence, the foundations of patriotism and Ukrainian identity. Thanks to this, even such apologists as Solomatin, Minister of Defense Lebedev, and Yezhel were unable to destroy it later. I won't even mention those who became involved in the squandering of military property.

I saw the first wave of media criticism directed at Kirill Budanov. In my opinion, he is the right person for the job. A young combat general in wartime should lead such a crucial structure as the Main Intelligence Directorate. However, because he is young and has achievements, he incites envy. People wonder why Budanov is recognized while I, also a general, am not. This is compounded by the syndrome of political image. This is a very alarming trend, and we must not allow it to continue.

But we must understand that the political image of those who cannot, are unable to perform at a high level, or abuse power will decline in society, while the image of authoritative combat generals will rise.

The Ukrainian military intelligence is built on the principles of American military intelligence and some European countries. It is a structure that does not allow for totalitarian influence. President Zelensky made a correct statement – Budanov is in place, Budanov is working. And I believe it should be this way.

Another important factor is Russian influence. If Russia can destabilize situations during elections in the U.S. and Europe, imagine what influence it can still exert on Ukraine, where, due to historical ties and the past, it knows everything. This influence is evident.

For example, a few weeks ago, the topic of pension provision for servicemen, who are defending their interests, including through the courts, was raised. Do you think Ms. Tretyakova does not understand that in wartime, when the mobilization structures have discredited themselves, such issues should not be raised? This was an attempt to destabilize the situation, and thank God that there were people in the administration, possibly in the NSDC, who warned her about the impracticality of this. However, I believe that after such actions, there should not be a warning but an interrogation by the Security Service, as such actions destabilize the defense sector.

What do you think is the most sensitive structure for Russia? The military intelligence is the most sensitive. The agent network operates, and within 5-10 exchanges, someone who believes in the rightness of the message emerges and starts making statements about the need to change the structure of the GUR and deal a devastating blow to the military intelligence system.

As someone who has contributed to the foundational principles on which Ukrainian military intelligence successfully fulfills its tasks, I have the moral right to say: hands off the GUR and Kirill Budanov.

– We understand how crucial intelligence data is in this war. Do you see signs that even today, as this large-scale war has lasted almost three years, some of our intelligence data is being leaked to the enemy?

– Undoubtedly, such manifestations exist. First and foremost, scientific analysts have proven that about 80% of intelligence information is gathered from open sources. This is complemented by technical capabilities. For example, we communicate by phone using secure lines, but a specific unit or structure receiving information through communication could technically bypass this protection.

I will give a glaring example. When in early 2014, when Russia had just begun military actions in Donbas, our soldiers often complained: we went on reconnaissance, and we were hit. But they went out with their mobile phones turned on in their pockets. Undoubtedly, the enemy immediately sees which group is moving along which route – this is shown by navigation. And a strike is launched.

We raised this issue with then-Secretary of the NSDC Turchinov, and only a year later did the Verkhovna Rada adopt a decision to restrict the use of mobile phones in combat operations. A year! Of course, with such delays, leaks will happen.

We must also not forget that the enemy is very cunning. We see simple sabotage actions that cannot be hidden – arson